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FEDERAL COURTS
When Is a State Court Case a Federal Case?
Or Can State Trial-Court Cases of an Appellate
Nature Be Taken to Federal Court?
by Jay E. Grenig
ISSUE
Does a federal district court have
original jurisdiction over a case
raising state-law and federal-law
challenges to the actions of a
municipal administrative agency,
when applicable state procedural
law provides that a state court
would decide the case as if on
appeal by conducting a deferential,
on-the-record review of the agency's
decision rather than retrying the
case?
FACTS
The International College of
Surgeons (the "College") owns two
main buildings and a rear coach
house on North Lake Shore Drive in
Chicago, Illinois. The College's
buildings have historical signifi-
cance, and in July 1988 the
Commission on Chicago Historical
and Architectural Landmarks (the
"Landmarks Commission" or the
"Commission") made a preliminary
determination that the College's
buildings, together with five others
nearby, met the criteria for
landmark designation.
Jay E. Grenig is
professor of law at Marquette
University Law School,
Milwaukee, WI;
(414) 288-5377.
The Commission notified the
College by mail of its preliminary
determination. But before the
Chicago City Council acted on
the Commission's determination,
the College entered into a contract
for the sale and redevelopment of
the property. Among other things,
the developer, Robin Construction
Corporation, contemplated erecting
a 41-story building on the property.
The sale was contingent on the
College's ability to obtain all
necessary permits and approvals. As
might be expected, the College was
unsuccessful. On the Commission's
recommendation and over the
College's strenuous objections, the
City Council enacted an ordinance
on June 28, 1989, officially desig-
nating the College's property and
the other five parcels as "The Seven
Houses on Lake Shore Drive
Landmark District." Acting
pursuant to the designating ordi-
nance and after holding a public
hearing at which the College was
denied the opportunity to present
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evidence on the proposed project,
the Commission rejected the
College's 1990 application for
demolition permits. In 1991 the
Commission issued a final adminis-
trative decision denying the
College's request for demolition per-
mits; that decision prompted the
College to file a state court lawsuit
seeking judicial review of the
Commission's decision.
The College, however, continued to
seek permits for the redevelopment
project. Close on the heels of its
lawsuit, the College applied to the
Landmarks Commission for an
economic hardship exception to the
Commission's earlier refusal to issue
demolition permits.
The hardship application was
denied, prompting the College to
file another state court lawsuit
against the City, the Landmarks
Commission, and various City offi-
cials (collectively, the "City"). Like
the College's first suit, this one
sought administrative review of the
Commission's decision, alleging that
denial of the economic hardship
application violated the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses,
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, as well
as the Takings Clause, U.S. CONST.
amend. V, el. 3. The College also
alleged that the Commission's
decision violated its rights under
the Illinois constitution. The
College further alleged that the
Commission's action violated the
City's Landmarks Ordinance, which
is the Commission's governing ordi-
nance, as well as the Commission's
rules and regulations, all claims
arising under state law.
The College's two state court suits,
as just noted, sought judicial review
of the Landmarks Commission's
final decisions. Under Illinois law,
judicial review of the Commission's
decisions would be limited to a
deferential review of the record
developed by the Commission as it
considered the College's permit
requests. In other words, although it
is a trial court and not an appellate
court, the Illinois state court
hearing the College's cases against
the Landmarks Commission would
not retry the entire administrative
matter; rather, in the fashion of an
appellate court, the Illinois court
would review the administrative
record to determine if the record
supported the decision being
challenged.
The City responded to the College's
two state court suits by removing
them to federal district court where
they were consolidated. In the City's
view, the federal court, which is a
trial court, had jurisdiction over the
cases because they presented issues
of federal law.
More maneuverings transpired
between the parties culminating in a
victory for the City. In an unreport-
ed decision, the district court
dismissed several of the College's
claims and held for the City on the
remaining claims.
The College appealed to the Seventh
Circuit which decided the case on
the basis of an issue neither party
had raised: Whether the College's
lawsuits were removable; that is,
whether the cases were civil cases
over which a federal district court
would have had original jurisdiction.
91 F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 1996).
The answer, said the Seventh
Circuit, was no. The appeals court
explained that Illinois law which
requires that a state court give
deferential review to final decisions
of state and local administrative
agencies, converts such cases into a
species of appeal. But, said the
Seventh Circuit, an appellate-like
case is not an original civil action
for purposes of the federal removal
statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
The Seventh Circuit held that the
College's lawsuits should have been
heard in the courts of Illinois and
entered orders to that effect.
The Seventh Circuit's decision is
now before the Supreme Court
which granted the City's petition for
a writ of certiorari. 117 S. Ct. 1424
(1997).
CASE ANALYSIS
The City maintains that suits in
which a plaintiff claims rights under
federal law are within a district
court's original jurisdiction even
when the federal claims are joined
with claims based on state law. The
City argues that the College's law-
suits alleged federal-law claims as
well as state-law claims and, accord-
ingly, were removable to federal
district court.
The City also points to the plain
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the
supplemental jurisdiction statute,
which provides that a federal
district court can hear and decide
state-law claims that are so related
to the federal claims "that they form
part of the same case or controver-
sv." The City contends that the
College's state-law claims easily sat-
isfv this test because they, like the
federal claims, arose from the same
dispute - the Commission's refusal
to issue demolition and construc-
tion permits.
The City also maintains that the
mere fact that the College's suits
arose from decisions of an adminis-
trative agency has no bearing on
the district court's jurisdiction.
Acknowledging that a proceeding
before an administrative agency is
not a civil case and may not be
removed to federal court, the City
nonetheless contends that once the
administrative proceeding ends and
a party seeks judicial review by
filing the appropriate complaint in a
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state trial court, the resulting
judicial proceeding is a civil case for
purposes of removal.
The City relies on Supreme Court
decisions holding that federal
district courts have original jurisdic-
tion to review federal administra-
tive-agency decisions and also
holding that federal courts have
original jurisdiction to review state
and local administrative-agency
decisions, if a standard allowing full
and de novo - that is, independent
- review, rather than deferential
review, is applicable. According to
the City, federalism's respect for
state and local decisionmaking is
not advanced by permitting federal
district courts to hear de novo
attacks on state and local adminis-
trative decisions, while denying to
those courts the ability to give def-
erence to those decisions. In addi-
tion, the City says that federalism is
not served by denying state and
local agencies the forum of their
choice when they are called on to
defend their decisions.
The College responds by stressing
that the Supreme Court's modern
decisions make clear that when a
state court is asked to consider the
propriety of an administrative
agency's decision, determining the
standard of review to be applied by
the state court is crucial in deciding
if the state court case is a civil case
for purposes of a federal district
court's jurisdiction. The College
observes that the majority of federal
appeals courts to have addressed
the issue have held that federal
district courts do not have jurisdic-
tion to conduct an on-the-record,
deferential review of the final deci-
sions of state or local administrative
agencies. See Labiche v. Louisiana
Patients Compensation Fund
Oversight Bd., 69 F.3d 21 (5th Cir.
1995); Fairfax County Redev. &
Hous. Auth. v. W.M. Schlosser Co.,
64 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1995);
Armistead v. C & M Transp., Inc.,
49 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 1995); FSK
Drug Corp. v. Perales, 960 F.2d 6
(2d Cir. 1992).
The College contends that the City
ignores the fact that the plain
language of all the jurisdictional
statutes at issue here presupposes
the existence of a civil case over
which the federal district courts
have original jurisdiction. Removal,
says the College, requires a
case to be tried, not reviewed.
Asserting that its challenges to the
Commission's decisions arise under
the Municipal Code of Chicago and
the Illinois Administrative Review
Act, the College says that the
federal issues raised are inextricably
intertwined with Illinois' administra-
tive review scheme. That review
scheme calls for judicial deference
to the record and decision of the
administrative agency and essential-
ly requires a court to act in an
appellate-like, rather than trial-like,
capacity.
The College also asserts that feder-
alism principles militate against
federal district courts - essentially,
trial-level courts - sitting as
appellate courts with respect to
decisions by state and local
administrative agencies. The College
says that even if the district
court had jurisdiction over its
administrative-review lawsuits, it
should have sent the cases back to
state court on abstention grounds.
(Abstention is a judge-made doc-
trine premised on principles of
federalism. It provides that even if
they have jurisdiction, federal
courts have discretion to refrain
from deciding certain cases out of
deference to state courts and out of
respect for the appropriate balance
between state and federal interests.)
The College reasons that abstention
is appropriate here because its
consolidated case raises a number
of important state-law claims
relating to the City's comprehensive
Landmarks Ordinance, claims that
implicate purely local policies.
The College contends that land use
cases are matters peculiarly within
the jurisdiction of states and
municipalities and, accordingly, are
best resolved in state court. The
College also maintains that this case
presents important and unsettled
questions of state law that should be
decided before the federal
constitutional issues are even
addressed.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court has held that a
state-court civil case seeking review
of the final decision of a state or
local administrative agency may be
removed to federal district court
when applicable state law permits
de novo judicial review of the deci-
sion, which means in essence that
the case is retried. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific R.R. Co. v. Stude,
346 U.S. 574 (1954). The Court also
has held that a district court may
hear an attack on a federal agency's
decision even though applicable
federal law requires deferential and
on-the-record review. The Court,
however, has never ruled on
whether a district court may hear
an attack on a state or local
agency's decision when applicable
state law requires deferential,
on-the-record review.
It has been suggested that a victory
for the College will increase the
barriers faced by private property
owners in having their Fifth
Amendment claims for just compen-
sation heard in federal court; they
will have to have their federal con-
stitutional claims heard by a state
court or forgo their state-law claims
if they want their federal claims
decided in federal court. More nar-
rowly, a decision for the College
sends the matter back to state court
for resolution. As the dispute
Issue No. 1
between the College and the City
began nearly a decade ago, return-
ing it to state court adds ever more
years to the litigation.
A decision for the City will make it
easier for an aggrieved party to
challenge state or local administra-
tive-agency decisions in federal
court or for defendants to remove
such cases to federal court. Since it
is relatively easy for a party to
allege that an administrative
agency's decision deprived the party
of due process or equal protection, a
decision for the City would make it
possible for a federal district
court to exercise jurisdiction over
virtually every lawsuit challenging
a state or local administrative
agency's decision.
The Court could take a different
tack, however. It could hold that the
district court had jurisdiction over
the College's state court lawsuits,
but also hold that the district court
should have abstained and allowed
the dispute to play out in state
court.
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